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This study is concerned with bidding of unit price
contracts. Existing balanced bidding models maximize the
expected profit or utility whereas existing unbalanced bidding
models maximize the present worth profit. In this report, an
unbalanced bidding model is proposed and formulated integrating
the features of both the balanced and unbalanced bidding
models, the objective of which is to maximize the expected
present worth profit. Various elements affecting the unbalancing
of bidding are identified and studied. Representative models are
investigated and compared with the proposed model. A computer
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1.1 Overview of the Bidding Problem
This study is concerned with bidding of unit price
contracts. Tenderers are required to enter a. rate to each item
of work to be carried out or material to be supplied. The total
bid is computed on the basis of the quantities of works estimated
by the client, and payments are made periodically for the work
actually carried out based on unit bidding prices.
It is possible for a bidder to get a greater measure of
effectiveness by varying unit bids, but with the same total bid.
If each unit bid provides the same profit margin in
carrying out a corresponding unit of work, then the unit bids are
called balanced bids. If different profit margins are applied to
the unit bids, then the bid is called unbalanced bid. It is
apparent that rates used in an unbalanced bid would not
ordinarily be used in bidding another contract even under similar
circumstances.
The main purpose of unbalancing in a bid is to improve the
cash flow and hence the present worth profit. This is particul-
arly important when the project is to be financed by borrowings.
Pre-tender manipulations of the unbalancing effects using
sound established techniques may provide an opportunity for the
bidder to gain a thorough understanding of the project and are
therefore beneficial to both the bidder and the client.
1.2 Statement of the Problem
In a large unit price contract such as those generally used
2in the construction industry, millions of dollars are involved
over a relatively long period of time, from one to several years,
and the financing aspect is more of a challenge than the
technological aspect. Since quantities of work specified by the
client in a. unit price contract are best estimates and therefore
approximate, whereas payments are made on the actual amount of
work carried out, the actual price of the contract is generally
different from the total bid. The total bid only serves for
appraising the bidder and it becomes less important once the
contract is awarded. This is due to the fact that the final
contract price is based on remeasurement and that there are
usually numerous changes made during the execution of the
contract as provided and allowed for in the contract.
The problem for bidding a large unit price contract are how
to improve finances of the project, how to tackle the problem of
the client's quantity mis-estimates and finally how to fix the
total bid so as to make the bid competitive and provide an
optimum expected profit.
1.3 Objectives of the Study
In a balanced bidding strategy, the objective is to optimize
the expected profit or utility. However the time value of the
profit is not accounted for. While utility concept is superior
conceptually, the utility function is not simple to establish.
The beauty of a balanced bidding strategy is in its ability to
determine the total bid in an analytical manner which is crucial
for bid appraisal.
Existing unbalanced bidding strategies give an optimum
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present worth profit for a certain total bid. The total bid may
be determined from judgement or intuition, together with detailed
cost analysis.
The main objective of this study is to devise a model to
integrate both the balanced and unbalanced bidding features to
obtain an optimum expected present worth profit. In using a
balanced bidding strategy, extensive information regarding the
bidder's and his competitors' past bidding data. is required.
This model attempts to reduce the amount of such information
required for successful use. If this information is not
available or incomplete, the model strives to generate an optimum
bid based on the bidder's desired rate of return, which would be
most useful for debt-financed projects at a. time when the
interest rate fluctuates. A computer programme is set up to do






There are quite a. number of balanced models. Some models
adopt the objective of maximizing expected profit, which is
accomplished by performing a trade-off between the amount of
profit at a. given bid price and the probability of winning with
that bid. Typical examples are those proposed by Friedman [1]
and Gates [3], while others proposed by Park [0] and Morin and
Clough C07 are simply adaptation of Friedman's. Other models
make use of the expected utility criterion, taking into account
the bidder's attitude towards risks, the objective of which is to
maximize expected utility by performing a trade-off between the
consequence of the bid and its associated utility. Willenbrock's
model [10] is of this type and Gupta and Cozzolino [4] suggest an
analytical utility function to simplify application.
As noted in Section 1.3, the utility concept is not easy to
conceive and hence not easy to apply in bidding situations.
Balanced bidding models of this type, and models adapted from
Friedman will not be studied further in this report. Friedman
and Gates were the poineers in establishing bidding models and
their models will be reviewed in this study.
For unbalanced bidding models, two types as proposed by
Stark [7.0], and Teicholz and Ashley C will be reviewed.
2.2 Friedman's Model
Friedman first proposed his bidding model in 1956. He made
the following assumptions in formulating his model.
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(i) The bidder bids the job at an amount B.
(ii) The estimated total cost of performing the work is C.
(iii) The bid/ cost ratios ,ri, of the competitors are
independent random variables.
(iv) The profit is the difference between the bid amount and
the true cost, which is a random variable.
The objective is to find the bid B over all possible bid
amounts which will maximize the expected profit, which is given
by
max E (p)= max (B-vC) P (B)
all B
where v is the mean of the distribution of the ratio of the true
cost to the estimated cost and P(B) the probability of winning at
the bid amount B.
If the identities of the n competitors are known, then
If the identities of all the competitors are not known,
then
P(B)= (1-F. (B/C))
The expression Fi(B/C) is the cumulative distribution
function of r1 evaluated at B/C, whereas F.,(B/C) is that of an
average competitor.
In the case of the average competitor, the probability
distribution function is formed by combining all previous ratios
r to form a single distribution.
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2.3 Gates' Model
Gates' model, also designed to maximize the expected
profit, differs from Friedman's in the method employed to assess
the probability of winning. According to Gates, if there are n






If the identities of the competitors are not known, the






It is apparent in Gates' model that, if there are n evenly
matched competitors, the probability of winning over the n
competitors is (o+1)-l.
2.4 Stark's Model
Stark's model is to maximize the present worth profit. The
objective function is
n m
Z= L' L' Q,t t1+r)-t (X-Y)
i=1 t=1
where Q,,t is the expected progress quantity of item i in period
t, r is the desired rate of return, X, and Yj are the unit bid
and unit cost of item i respectively, and n and m are the number
of items and number of periods respectively.
There are three types of constraints in this model as
follows:-
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i) The Bid Constraint- The total bid is to be kept within a
certain limit.
where Si is the client's estimated quantity of item i and B
the total bid.
ii) Unit Bid Constraints- Constraints are usually needed to
express desired or required technical relationships between
unit bids this type of constraint is called formality
constraint. An example is
where X4 and X. are the unit bids of items d and e
respectively. Another type of constraint to conceal
pricing policy is the bounds constraint expressed
mathematically as
where L, and U, are the lower and upper bounds of unit bid
of item i respectively.
iii) Rate Constraints- Sometimes the rate at which payments are
to be made for completed items requires to be commensurate
with the completion rate of the project. For example, if
the estimated completion time for the project is k time
units then the payments made through the j th time period,
j 4 k, should be proportional to the total charge upon
completion. That is, the rate constraint is
where a is the constant of proportionality as desired by
8
the bidder.
2.5 Teicholz and Ashley's Model
The objective of this model is also to maximize the present
worth profit but with different objective function and
constraints.
The objective function is
where P1 is the probability of the i th item being executed
and Ft and It are the fixed cost and interest cost in the t
th period respectively.
There are only two types of constraints in this model.
i) Bid Constraint- The total probable bid amount must cover
the expected costs and allow the desired margin, M.
in which B=
ii) Bid Price Constraints- The bid price constraint is the
same as the bounds constraint in Stark's model.
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Chapter 3
FORMULATION OF AN UNBALANCED BIDDING MODEL
3.1 Introduction
The main objective of this chapter is to consider various
elements which affect the unbalancing of bidding, to develop a
mathematical model that permits bidders to express their
experiece in a formalized manner and to maximize the expected
present worth of future profit. The elements to be considered
are typical of those commonly found in construction contracts and
additional elements affecting individual bidders may be included
to meet Darticular reouirements.
3.2 Desired Rate of Return
The proposed model makes use of the desired rate of return
as specified by the bidder to cover such costs as cost of
capital, head office overheads and the desired profit margin.
This approach has two advantages. Firstly, the bidder will know
exactly how much he will get in terms of percentage when bidding
at a particular price and secondly, head office overheads are
necessarily an arbitrary allocation of cost, and hence their
inclusion in a contract would be misleading in the appraisal of
contract performance.
Usually the capital needed by a bidder for his projects
comes from the company itself and from borrowing. The cost of
capital for each of these two sources is different. In
determining the cost of capital, factors such as inflation,
dividends for share holders, corporation tax and the prevailing
interest rates are of direct influence. However the general
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economic condition of the market and the comapny itself
implicitly affect the rate of return desired by the bidder.
Therefore the desired rate of return is partly quantifiable
and partly a top level managerial decision which will reflect the
general pol icy of a company.
3.3 Quantities of Work
As stated in Section 1.2, quanities of work specified by
the client are the initial best estimates and may change during
the execution of the contract. If a bidder believes that there
are quantity misestimates, he can take advantage of the situation
by setting low unit rates to items which he thinks have been
over-estimated and high unit rates to items which he thinks have
been under-estimated.
This is a tricky process and represents the bidder's best
estimates and judgement. The bidder can get some extra profit
from the client's quantitiy misestimates by unbalancing, but he
may sustain a loss if he estimates incorrectly. Therefore the
bidder has to face some degree of risk and in general unit rates
will be confined within certain limits to protect the integrity
of the bid and to avoid.heavy loss.
3.4 Constraints of Unit Bids
A bidder can vary unit bids as he wishes but should limit
them within certain ranges in order to rationalze his bid.
Besides, the bidder should also observe some desired or required
technical relationships among unit bids. Stark calls such
relationships formality constraints.
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3.5 Optimum Total Bid
In the existing unbalanced models, the total bid is
determined from judgement or intuition together with detailed
cost analysis. In this study the total bid is determined
corresponding to a markup yielding an optimum expected present
worth profit and incorporates some features of balanced bidding
models. The proposed model can also minimize the total bid base
on the bidder's desired rate of return.
3.6 Probability of Winning
Friedman's and Gates' models have the same basic structure
but are different in the method to assess the probability of
winning. They both require the bidder's and the competitors'
past bidding records on common bids. This has proved to be
difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.
In assessing the probability of winning, both models
require the bidder to know how many competitors are bidding and
their identities.
The other drawback of these models is in their application
when the number of competitors is sufficiently large, as the
probability of winning yielded by these models becomes
unacceptably low and unrealistic.
To overcome all these difficulties, the proposed model
adopts the lowest bid/ cost ratios to form a single probability
distribution to assess the winning probability. The lowest bid/
cost ratio is defined as the ratio of the lowest bid( or the
winning bid as virtually all cases are) and the cost estimate of
the bidder. This approach is of practical advantage as the
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bidder's main concern is to ensure his bid is lower than his
lowest competitor. The winning bid price can be knot-in easily and
the probability of winning, P, is
P= 1- F(rbc)
where F(rbc) is the cumulative probability distribution of the
lowest bid/ cost ratio rbc
Markup, u, defined as the percentage added to the cost for
profit is convenient to use, and the probability of winning at
markup u corresponds to the case when rb== 1+ u.
3.7 Fixed Expenditure and Variable Costs
In the proposed model, fixed expenditure in each period is
used in preference to the distributed unit fixed costs. This is
because the time when cash is outlaid is the most important in
considering the time value of money. Such expenditure includes
initial set-up costs for the project, mobilization for certain
items of work, salaries for adminstrative staff and other outlays
independent of individual items of work. Variable cost for each
item of work is built up from detailed cost analysis and should
be reasonably directly proportional to the volume of work.
3.8 Present Worth Receipt
Cash outlays are taken to incur at the end of each payment
period. Periodic payments are usually received some time after
each period, and this time lag is called the billing period. A
certain percentage of monies is held back by the client as
retention but will be released after certain time which is called
retention payback period. Receipts are computed based on the
estimated progress quantities of work carried out in each period.
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The present worth receipt R can be expressed as
where X, is the unit rate of item i to be determined from the
proposed model, O,,t the quantity of item i carried out at period
t as estimated by the bidder, u the retention factor, r the
desired rate of return, b the billing period, g the retention
payback period.
The above equation can be simplified to
3.9 Present Worth Expenditure
Expenditure is made up of two portions, fixed and variable.
The present worth fixed portion, F, is
where Ft is the fixed expenditure in period t and the present
worth variable portion, V, is
where Yi is the variable cost of item i. It can be seen that for
a given rate of return r, both the present worth fixed and
variable portions of expenditure are constant. Therefore the
total present worth expenditure (F+V) is also constant.
3.10 Structure of the Proposed Model
The objective of the proposed model is to maximize the
expected present worth profit.
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Objective function: max E(p)= max (p * P(u))
all u
where E(p) is the expected present worth profit, P(u) the
probability of winning at a markup of u and p the present worth
profit to be maximized by using linear programming techniques as
follows:-
Maximize p=




where Si= client's quantity for work item i
T= total cost
Ui, L1= upper and lower bounds of item i
ci= coefficient of item i in the formality
constraint
u= markup
The alternative objective of minimizing the total bid for
achieving a. certain desired rate of return can be obtained by
setting the present worth profit equal to zero.
Alternative objective function: Minimize B
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Constraints: Zero present worth profit
Unit bid and formality constraints remaining
as previously defined
3.11 Sensitivity Analysis
It is useful for the bidder to investigate how sensitive
his bid price is to the various constraints. The effect of
changes in the constraints carp be found as a side product of the
linear programming method which is the basic tool of this model.
In practice the bidder's major concern is how sensitive his bid
price is to his total estimate. The sensitivity is indicated by
the range of costs over which the selected bid price will give
the best result in the potential present worth profit.
Let: Tc, be the cost estimate which could have a lowest value of
T 2 and a highest value of Tr,.
Be, the selected optimum bid based on the cost estimate To.
B1 the immediate bid price lower than the optimum bid
permitted by the bidder.
Bh the immediate bid price higher than the optimum bid
permitted by the bidder.
If the bid B1 is selected based on cost T1 and bid Bo is
selected based on cost To, then it will just pay to change the
bid from Bo to B1 if the cost T1 is such that the expected value




where P(B) is the probability of winning given that the bid price
is B, and the superscript' denotes present worth.
Solving the above two equations, T1' and Th' are obtained.
This means that over the range T1 and T, for the cost, the
expected value of present worth profit stays maximum. Therefore
some inaccuracy in the cost estimate is tolerated and exact cost
estimate may not be absolutely necessary in making the right
decision. But of course the profit actually realized will be
changed.
3.12 Computer Programme
A computer programme is appended to this report (Appendix
I) and is designed to carry out the optimization described in the
preceding sections. The programme is written in CP/M Fortran IV
language on an Apple II computer. The linear programming part is
also included in the above programme thus alleviating the need to
use external established subroutines. Simplex method is used for
the linear programming. The input format and the flow chart are
included as Appendices I I and III respectively.
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Chapter 4
ILLUSTRATION OF THE PROPOSED MODEL
4.1 Introduction
This chapter will illustrate how the model formulated in
the last chapter can be applied to the real-world situation.
4.2 Collection of Data
The data has been collected from a construction contractor
in Hong Kong, and consists of his past bidding records including
his cost estimates and his total bid price. Details of the
winning bid price, usually the lowest, are also included. The
data is tabulated in Table 1. I t is used for the assessment of
probability of winning and is intended for illustration purposes
only.
4.3 Probability Assessment
The ratios of the winning bid to the contractor's cost
estimate and the cumulative frequency distribution of the ratios
are computed and tabulated in Table 2. Based on these results,
the probability of winning curve is plotted in Figure 1. From
Figure 1, the following can be obtained.





1.07 7% 0. 750
1.08 8% 0. 700
4%
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4.4 Illustration of Application of the Model
A hypothetical bidding case is taken to illustrate the
application of the proposed model. The quantities of work are
simplified and shown in Table 3. Based on the information and
requirements stipulated in the tender document and the bidder's
assessment, a schedule of progress quantities is drawn up as
shown in Table 4. Fixed expenditure for each payment period and
variable cost for each work item are carefully analysed and
tabulated in Table 5. According to the bidder's past experience,
he sets out a range of limits for each unit bid and establishes
the necessary formality constraints, as shown in Table 6.
Other information of the project relevant to this study is
as follows:-
(i) Billing period is one month.
(ii) Retention is 5% for each payment.
(iii) Contract period is 6 months.
(iv) Retention payback period is 6 months after the completion
of the contract.
The bidder desires a rate of return of 18% per annum (i.e.
1.5% per month).
4.5 Results From the Model
All the data in the preceding two sections is input to the
computer. Output from the computer is included as Appendix IV.
Selected results are tabulated in Table 7. It can be seen that
in order to maximize the expected present worth profit, a markup
of 8% should be used. This is the optimum markup. The optimum
total bid is $638,172 and the expected present worth profit is
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$56, 345.
If the bidder does not have or does not want to use past
bidding data to enable the establishment of the probability of a
winning function, the computer programme will minimize the total
bid for achieving a desired rate of return. In the example the
minim!im total bid is determined to be $616,325 for achieving an
effective rate of return of 18% per annum.
It is noted from the computer results that there is a vast
difference in the optimum unit bids under the two different
objectives.
4.6 Solution Sensitivity
It is assumed that the optimum markup yielded by the
proposed model may be adjusted subjectively by 1% based on past
experience. The optimum markup has been found to be 8% and the
present worth of the total bid at a markup of 8% is $701,397 as
obtained by computer.
Sirni la.rly, for markups of 7% and 9%, the present worths of
the total bids are $695,916 and $706,878 respectively.
With the probability function established in Section 4.3
and following the procedure outlined in Section 3.11, the
following results are obtained.
As the present worth cost estimate, To', is $620,934, Ti',
and Ti,' will be 0.997 and 1.05 times of To' respectively. It
i.e. Bo'=$701, 397





means that the cost estimate may tolerate -0.3% to 5% without
altering the selection of the optimum total bid within 1%. It
can also be interpreted as that the optimum markup can be lowere
by 1% if the cost is decreased by 0.3% and the Optimum markup
should be raised by 1% if the cost is increased by 5%, in order
to maintain the expected result of the bid.
4.7 Effect of Variations in Input Parameters
Three input parameters, namely rate of return, billing
period and retention factor, are varied to investigate their
effects on the present worth profit, cash flow and selection of
unit bids and total bid.
4.7.1 Rate of Return
By varying the desired rate of return, sets of results are
obtained. Selected results are shown in Table 8 and presented
graphically in Figure 2. It can be seen that, as the rate of
return increases, the optimum markup increases, but the expected
present worth profit decreases howeverthe optimumunit bids ar only slightly altered. The minimumtotal bid also increases with
the rate of return.
4.7.2 Billing Period and Retention Factor
The results for different billing periods and retention
factors are shown in Tables 9 and 10 respectively. The graphical
presentation of these results is included in Figures 3 and 4.
These figures show that neither the billing period nor the
retention factor- has an effect on the selection of the optimum
markup or optimum unit bids. However the expected present worth
profit decreases and the minimum total bid decreases, with
21
increasing billing period or retention factor. As the billing
period becomes longer or the retention factor becomes larger, the
cash flow becomes less favourable.
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Chapter 5
COMPARISON OF THE BIDDING MODELS
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the existing models reviewed in Chapter 2
are studied further, using the same data as in Chapter 4, and are
then compared with the model proposed in Chapter 3. The
advantages and limitations of each model are also investigated.
5.2 Friedman's Model
In Friedman's model, the expected profit E(p) can be
simplified to
E(p)= P(rb.) (rb.- v) 1009'0
where E(p) is the expected profit, rb. the bid/ cost ratio, v
the mean ratio of the actual cost to the estimated cost and
P(rt,.) the probability of winning at a given bid/ cost ratio
rt... The ratio of the actual cost to the estimated cost is
called the cost variability factor.
For comparison purposes the lowest bid /cost ratios are
used to evaluate the probability of winning. For a given v the
expected profit is computed at each bid/ cost ratio. The
optimum markup corresponds to the bid which will yield maximum
expected profit. The markup is plotted in Figure 5 against the
expected profit at different values of v. I t can be seen that a
higher optimum markup will result from a cost variability-factor
greater than one, which means lesser chance of getting the job,
and the expected profit will decrease as the cost variability
factor increases.
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Assuming that the actual cost is the same as the estimated
cost, from Figure 5 the optimum markup is obtained at 9% and the
corresponding expected profit is 5.67%. The total cost (fixed
plus variable) has been computed as $590,900 hence the total bid
is $644,041 and the expected profit from Friedman's model is
$3 7,, 504.
The unit bids are obtained by distributing the fixed cost
and the markup to each item on prorata basis. With these unit
bids, the present worth profit is computed to be $49,733 and the
expected present worth profit $31,366.
5.3 Gates' Model
The basic structure of Gates' model remains the same as
that of Friedman's but differs in the method to assess the
probability of winning. Gates' method will yield a higher
probability of winning as the number of competitiors increases.
Hence a higher optimum markup will result from Gates' model.
When the number of competitors is one, both Fr i edman' s and Gates'
models will give the same results. Hence for the purposes of
this study, in which the lowest bidder's past bidding behaviour
is employed to assess the probability of winning, Gates' and
Friedman's models will yield identical results.
5.4 Stark's Model
The profit to be maximized in Stark's model is taken as the
difference of the unit bids and the unit costs. In order that
the present worth profit is not misassessed, all the unit costs
must be of a largely variable nature. The total bid appears as a
constraint in Stark's model and must be fixed by the bidder
before using this model.
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Direct comparison between Stark's model and the model
proposed by the writer is impossible due to the difference in the
cost structure of the models.
5.5 Teicholz and Ashley's Model
In Teicholz and Ashley's model, fixed costs and interest
costs are separated from the variable costs this approach is
suitable for qeneral use. The total bid is set to cover all
costs plus a desired profit margin. The present worth profit to
be maximized is exclusive of the interest costs and is
therefore the net present worth profit for retention or
reinvestment.
One feature of Teicholz and Ashley's model is in the
assignment to each of the items of work a probability of
executing that item. Their model does not explain how this
probability can be assessed but it may be assumed to be the
bidder's best Judgement.
The total bid can be fixed from a balanced model as
described in Section 5.2, and is equal to $644,081 at an optimum
markup of 9%. Assuming that the probability of executing each
item of•work is one and that the interest costs are included in
the present worth profit, the expected present worth profit is
found to be $56, 164.
5.6 Comparison of the Results
The results from Chapter 4 and the preceding sections of
this chapter are sumarised below:-
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Present Expected present
Total bid worth profit worth profit
The proposed model 638,172 80,493 56,345
A balanced model
(eq. Friedman's 644,081 48,788 31,366
or Cates')
An unbalanced model 644,081 85,974 54,164
(eg. Teicholz and
Ashley's)
From the above resu.lts, it can be concluded that if the
data is indicative of the future, the illustration is strong to






Balanced bidding models such as those proposed by Friedman
and Gates are easy to use. The only difference between their
models is in the method employed to assess the probability of
winning.
In general, Gates' model suggests a higher probability of
winning thus resulting in a. higher optimum markup, which in
practice means a lower chance of getting the job.
As a result of the lower markup yielded by Friedman's
model, the chance of winning the job becomes higher but at a
lower profit. Friedman's model is therefore suitable for those
who want to increase profit through high turnover of work.
Friedman's and Gates' models have a common drawback, in
that they require extensive bidding information about other
bidders. This may be difficult to obtain. The model proposed by
the writer thus utilizes the lowest bidder's bidding
characteristics to establish the winning probability function.
The probability of winning so obtained is practically the lowest
and is therefore close to that yielded by Friedman's model.
The other disadvantage of using balanced bidding models is
that the time value of money cannot be accounted for.
Existing unbalanced bidding models maximize present worth
profit subject to various constraints. Their basic structures
are similar, all utilizing linear programming techniques in the
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maximization process. The objective function and constraints may
differ- from those of other models. If the unit rate is directly
related to the unit cost and no costs independent of the
individual items of work are incurred, then Stark's objective
function is appropriate although in practice this is rarely the
case as costs may be incurred periodically to cover such thin9sas
overheads, mobilization etc. Teicholz and Ashley's model takes
account of these costs. In addition this model suggests that the
probability of executing an item be included but does not explain
how to assess such probability. The interest costs and the
desired profit margin are also included in the model and hence
the present worth profit to be maximized by their model is
readily for reinvestment.
The model proposed by the writer maintains the simplicity
of Friedman's model in the assessment of the probability of
winning. This model makes use of the desired rate of return to
cover interest costs, risk, cost of capital etc. and incorporates
all the essential elements as commonly encountered in a
construction contract.
The extra profit of unbalancing in this model comes from
two sources:-
- Improved cash flow, and
- Client's quantity misestimates.
The illustration in Chapter 4 shows that in minimizing a
bid to achieve a. desired rate of return, higher unit rates are
assigned to items which will be executed at the later stage of
the contract. But if the objective is to maximize the presenmt
worth profit, higher unit rates are assigned to items which will
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be executed first, and this method of unbalancing is often called
"frontloading."
6.2 Conclusions
The study of the bidding strategies leads to the following
conclusions.
(A) For the bidding strategies in general
(i) Using a competitive bidding strategy can give a bidder a
competitive advantage even if all his competitors employ
such strategy. Whether or not a bidder can benefit from it
depends on how much effort he spends on applying the
strategy.
(ii) The important key to success in bidding is an accurate
estimate of cost. Higher optimum markups will result from
higher estimates which reduce the chance of getting the
job.
(iii) Each model has its own limitations and advantages.
Provided that the bidder understands these limitations and
advantages, the bidding models are a definite asset.
(B) For the proposed bidding model in particular
(i) The proposed model can be used to determine the total bid
which will give maximum expected present worth profit.
(ii) The model carp determine the minimum total bid for
achieving a certain rate of return.
(iii) As the desired rate of return increases, the optimum markup
increases but the expected present worth profit decreases.
(iv) The optimum unit bids and total bid are not altered by
varying the billing period or the retention factor.
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These factors however affect the amount of present worth
profit and cash flow.
(v) This model is superior to existing balanced bidding models
because it optimizes the expected present worth profit and
only requires readily available information.
(vi) This model is superior to existing unbalanced bidding
models because it integrates the probability of winning in
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Table 1 Bidding Data
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Computed Lowest Bid/ Lowest Bid) Cumulative






















Table 2a Computed Lowest
Bid/Cost Ratios





2 Excavate in soft material 3000 cu m
3 Excavate in hard material 500 cu m
4 Compact filling material 3000 cu rn
5 Subbase 700 cu m
6 1000 sq mConcrete pavement
7 Road kerb 100 m
Parapet8 200 m
9 Surface water channel 220 m
10 Hydroseeding 1000 sq m
Table 3 Bill of Quanities
Payment Period
Item No. 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 1
2 500 1000 2000 2000
3 300 300
4 500 1000 2000 2000
5 100 200 200 200
6 200 250 300 250
7 50 60
8 50 100 40
9 100 100
10 200 300 400
Table 4 Estimated Progress Quantities
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Item ft Variable Cost$ Period# Fixed Expenditure$
1 8,000 1 10, 000
2 12 10,0002
3 300 3 10,000
4 6 10,000
5 85 5 10,000





Table 5 Fixed Expenditure and Variable Costs
Unit Bid












Table 6 Unit Bid and Formality Constraints
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Present Worth Expected Present
Markup% Total Bid$ Profit$ Worth Profit$
6 626,354 69,532 55, 62 5
7 632, 263 75,013 56, 259
8 638, 172 80,493 56,345
9 644,081 85, 974 54,164
10 649, 990 91,455 50,300
11 655, 899 96,936 43,621
12 661,808 102,416 35,846
Optimum Total Bid= $638,172 at markup 8%
Item Optimum Unit Bid Item Opt. Unit Bid to
Yield Min. Total
No. at markup 8%($) No. Bid($)
1 15,000.00 1 10, 000.00
2 20.00 2 10.00
3 500.00 3 300.00
4 10.00 5.00
5 54.53 5 66.75
6 110.00 6 180.00
7 120.00 7 60.00
8 400.00 600.00
9 150.00 9 230.00
10 3.00 10 8.00
Minimum Total Bid for Achieving a Rate of Return of 1.5%
p.m.= $616,325




Rate of Return Min Total Bid Optimum Markup Expected PW Pft
% P.M.
1 611,421 7 60,527
1.25 613,877 7.5 58,433
1.50 616,325 S 56,345
Optimum Unit Bid$
For Maximizing PW Profit@ r=
Item No. 1 1.25 1.5
1 15,000 15, 000 15, 000
2 20 20 20
3 500 500 500
4 10 10 10
5 56.09 60.31 64 m 53
6 110 110 110
7 120 120 120
8 400 400 400
9 150 150 150
10 3 3 3





Billing Period Min Total Bid Optimum Markup Expected PW Pft
month 96
1 616,325 8 56,345
1.5 621,098 8 52, 868
2 625,904 8 49,417
2.5 630,743 8 45, 991
Optimum Unit Bid$
Item Noe For Min Total Bid@ b= For Max. PW
1 1.5 2 2.5 Profit
1 LO, 000 10,000 10, 000 10,000 15, 000
2 10 10 10 10 20
3 300 300 300 300 500
4 5 5 5 5 10
5 66.75 73.57 80.43 87.35 64.53
6 180 180 180 180 110
7 60 60 60 60 120
8 600 600 600 600 400
9 230 230 230 230 150
10 8 8 8 a 3




Retention Factor Min Total Bid Optimum Markup Expected PW Pf
5 616,325 8 56,345
7.5 617,974 8 55,089
10 619,633 8 53,833
15 622,975 8 51,321
Optimum Unit Bid$
For Min Total Bid@ u= For Max.PW
Item No 5 7.5 10 15 Profit
1 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 15,000
2 10 10 10 10 20
3 300 300 300 300 500
4 5 5 5 5 10
5 66.75 69.11 71°48 76.25 64.53
6 180 180 180 180 110
7 60 60 60 60 120
8 600 600 600 600 400
9 230 230 230 230 150
10 8 8 8 8 3
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Figure 5 Plot of Expected Percentage Profit against Markup
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7004 FORMAT (3X,'RATE OF RETURN P.M.=',F6.4,'%',/3X,'BILLING






1000 READ (1,1301) I,J,Z
1301 FORMAT (2I4,F10.2)
IF (I.EQ.O) GO TO 1001
P(I,J)=Z
GO TO 1000
1001 READ (1,1002) N1
1002 FORMAT (14)
DO 1003 I=1,N1









































2002 FORMAT (/3X,'FIXED PW COST =',F10.2,/3X,'VAR. PW COST
C=',F1O.2,/3X,'TOTAL PW COST =',F10.2)
CALL LIN (A,W,N2,N3,N4)
WRITE (2,7005) A(1,JJ)
















1020 WRITE (2,1030) UP(I),TP,PW,C9
1030 FORMAT (6X,'MARKUP =',F6.3,/6X,'TOTAL BID =',F10.2,/6X,














IF ((I.EQ.1).AND.(J.LE.N2)) GO TO 12
46
IF ((I.EQ.II).AND.(J.LE.N2)) GO TO 12




400 READ (6,301) I,J,Z
301 FORMAT (214,F10.2)



















IF(I.GE.III) GO TO 40
IF(L(I).NE.0) GO TO 23
25 DO 27 J=1,JJ









IF(J.GE.JJ) GO TO 45




45 IF(L(K).EO.0) GO TO 62
46 KJ=L(K)
DO 120 I=29II








IF(I.GT.II) GO TO 56
47
IF(A(I,KJ).LE.0.) GO TO 50
51 X=A(I,JJ)IA(I,KJ)
IF(JK.EQ.O) GO TO 53

















IF((A(JK,J). EQ.O.).OR.(W(I).EQ.O.)) GO TO 61






62 IF(K.LE.1) GO TO 70
63 IJ=JJ-1
DO 65 J=1,IJ















7020 FORMAT (3X,'ITEM NO. OPT. UNIT BID')
DO 7021 I=1,N2








TN DATA FILE- DAT A„FOR
a, b, c 214 a- number of items
b- number of inequality constraints
c- number of equality constraints
d,e 2F10.5
f. a 2F10. 5
h 14
d- 1+ rate of return
e- billing period
f- retention factor
g- retention payback period
h- contract duration
i J 5 k 214, F10.2 i- itern number
j- period number
k- estimated progress quantity
To end input put i= 00,0,0.
1 14 1- number of markup
m, n 2F10.5 m- 1+ markup
n- probabi1ity
Number of entries= 1
P F10. 2 p- fixed expenditure at each period
N u.mber of entries= h
q F10. 2 q- unit variable cost
Number of entries= a
r F10. 2 r- item quantity in the bill
Number of entries= a
IN DATA FILE- DAT A2.FOR
s, t, u 214, F10.2 s- constraint number
t- it em number
u- coefficient
s starts from 2 and ends at b+c+1
To terminate input set s= 0
0,0,0,
v F10, 2 v- right hand side coefficient of
the constraints







J J= N2+ 11
III=II+1
B1. B2






















I; N5 1= 1+ 1
1= 1
Y(I)



















.7= .7 4 1
I. V( I
V1=V1+VI)Y(I
7; M 7= 7+
.7=
A( I I. J) =R( .7
CJ: N: J=J+








J: N5 J= J+ j
T V=0
J= 1
A( 11. J )=Q(J)
TV=TV+Y(J)Q(J)
A(laJ)=-R(J)


















I: l 7 I N
T! T I J: N2
T: T T J: J J
A(I,J)=0
J: J J J= J+ l

























1= 1+ 1 14
I: ill K= 113




A( I, J) : 0
A( 111, J)=
A( 111, J)- A( I, J)
J: J J J= J+ 1
J= J+ 1
J: JJ A( k. 7): c
L (K): c W (K): A(K,JJ
k T= l( k W(K)=A(K,J)
































A (I, J )=A(I,J)-
W(T)A(.TK..ll X
J: JJ J=J+ l
T: TT 1= 1+ 3
J= 3
A(JK,J)=A(JK.J)X







J: JJ J=J+ 1
J= 3
A(III.J)=0








1: 11 1= 1 +1
1= 1
I. W( I)





To aviod yielding condition in the optimization procei
the following adjustments have been made in the input
Item No. Quantity Unit Rate
1 multiplied by 1000 divided by 1000
7,8 & 9 multiplied by 10 divided by 10
Therefore the computer output has to be adjusted
accordingly as follows:-
Item No. Unit Rate
1 multiply by 1000
7,8 & 9 multiply by 10
RATE OF RETURN P.M.=1.5000% FEASIBLE
BILLING PERIOD MON.= 1.0 ITEM NO. OPT. UNIT BID
RETENTION FACTOR = .05 1 10.00
2 10.00
TOTAL FIXED EXP.= 60000.00 3 300.00
TOTAL VAR. COST= 530900.00 4 5.00
5 66.75
R( 1)= 963.95 6 180.00
R( 2)= 5153.42 7 6.00
R( 3)= 558.17 8 60.00
R( 4)= 5080.66 9 23.00
R( 5)= 649.27 10 8.00
R( 6)= 915.93 MIN TOTAL BID= 616324.57
R( 7)= 1008.21
R( 8)= 1731.59
R( 9)= 1834.30 FEASIBLE
R(10)= 817.04 ITEM NO. OPT. UNIT BID
V( 1)= 985.22 1 15.00
V( 2)= 5260.28 2 20.00
V( 3)= 569.55 3 500.00
V( 4)= 5182.54 4 10.00
V( 5)= 662.42 5 47.65
V( 6)= 933.92 6 110.00
V( 7)= 1028.05 7 12.00
V( 8)= 1765.17 8 40.00
V( 9)= 1870.44 9 15.00
V(10)= 832.73 10 3.00
MARKUP= 1.060
FIXED PW COST= 56971.87 TOTAL BID= 626354.00
VAR. PW COST= 563931.92 PW PROFIT= 69531.78
TOTAL PW COST= 620903.79 EXP PW PFT= 55625.42
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FEASIBLE FEASIBLE
ITEM NO. OPT. UNIT BID ITEM NO. OPT. UNIT BID
1 15.00 1 15.00
2 20.00 2 20.00
3 500.00 3 500.00
4 10.00 4 10.00
5 56.09 5 81.41
6 110.00 6 110.00
7 12.00 7 12.00
8 40.00 8 40.00
9 15.00 9 15.00
10 3.00 10 3.00
MARKUP= 1.070 MARKUP= 1.100
TOTAL BID= 632263.00 TOTAL BID= 649990.00
PW PROFIT= 75012.55 PW PROFIT= 91454.88
EXP PW PFT= 56259.41 EXP PW PFT= 50300.18
FEASIBLE FEASIBLE
ITEM NO. OPT. UNIT BID ITEM NO. OPT. UNIT BID
1 15.00 1 15.00
2 20.00 2 20.00
3 500.00 3 500.00
4 10.00 4 10.00
5 64.53 5 89.86
6 110.00 6 110.00
7 12.00 7 12.00
8 40.00 8 40.00
9 15.00 9 15.00
10 3.00 10 3.00
MARKUP= 1.080 MARKUP= 1.110
TOTAL BID= 638172.00 TOTAL BID= 655899.00
PW PROFIT= 80493.33 PW PROFIT= 96935.66
EXP PW PFT= 56345.33 EXP PW PFT= 43621.05
FEASIBLE FEASIBLE
ITEM NO. OPT. UNIT BID ITEM NO. OPT. UNIT BID
1 15.00 1 15.00
2 20.00 2 20.00
3 500.00 3 500.00
4 10.00 4 10.00
5 72.97 5 98.30
6 110.00 6 110.00
7 12.00 7 12.00-
8 40.00 8 40.00
9 15.00 9 15.00
10 3.00 10 3.00
MARKUP= 1.090 MARKUP= 1.120
TOTAL BID= 644081.00 TOTAL BID= 661808.00
PW PROFIT= 85974.10 PW PROFIT= 102416.43
EXP PW PFT= 54163.69 EXP PW PFT= 35845.75


